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.The report concluded:While the extreme difficulty of the problems is realised, it is agreed thatthere is no one technical factor which rules out the possibility of a defencesystem against a V.2 weapon&The problem of active defence is incomparably more difficult than thatof passive defence& very little work has so far been done.The effortrequired to proceed with a complete G.W.project would be very large andwould not be justified at this stage.Theoretical and experimentalassessment of both the method of guidance& and of the warhead and fuzeproblem, as well as the radar reflection problem are among the necessarypreliminaries to a complete assessment.The sub-committee invited the DRPC to assess the importance of such work and to allocate an appropriate priority to research.The radar experimental work was the mostimportant as without it work on an interceptor would be of little value.The DRPC itselfdeferred any firm decision pending the results of Conference Ally with the AmericansBritain and ballistic missile defence 1942 2002 56after which the subject would be considered again.In the meantime, no operationalrequirement existed.20CONFERENCE ALLYThe UK-US Conference Ally was a wide-ranging technical exchange of views on airdefence subjects, held on 18 20 February 1953 at RAF Old Sarum in Wiltshire.It waspart of a series of such contacts between the two countries, of which the 1949 conferenceon rocket intelligence had been an early example.One topic discussed was warning anddefence against long-range missiles.21Two detailed papers were presented, one from each country, and formed the basis forall discussions.The US paper22 identified the three essential characteristics of the ballisticmissile as a target speed, height and radar cross-section (or reflectivity).In view of thepaucity of intelligence about Soviet missiles at this time, contemporary US systems weretaken as examples.Any defence against such threats would require further radardevelopment, automatic data processing and have to employ an interceptor not having aspeed advantage over its target.Additionally, No time is available for human decisions.The first requirement was the development of suitable radars for surveillance, trackingand homing.The latter was required as the short timelines precluded command guidanceor beam-riding.Passive infrared homing might be possible in the future.Defence against short-range threats like the V-2 was considered as well as missiles ofintercontinental range.Countering an ICBM involved the same basic issues as the V-2,but to a more challenging degree.The paper s author concluded that no defence againstan ICBM could at present be visualised, so as to render its consideration for the momentunprofitable.The British paper, as might be expected, dealt solely with the V-2-type threat.23Existing radars could provide early warning, but with an inaccurate prediction of point offall.Tracking a V-2 was possible with new radars positioned ahead of the target area.Theonly solution to the control problem of an interceptor was seen to be mid-course guidanceand semi-active terminal homing.Interception at ranges of more than about 40,00050,000 yards (20 25 miles) was unlikely.In view of the ease with which a V-2 warheadcould be protected, terminal lethality was the key problem to which no solution is seen.The paper concluded:for a given level of technical development ability, it will be easier toprovide a successful attacking missile than a successful defence against it.The only real solution seen is to seize, and maintain, the technical leadin strategic offensive weapons as the only effective deterrent againstattack.Two salient conclusions emerged from Conference Ally.Early warning was desirable,and achievable, as five minutes warning could reduce the casualties from an atomicstrike by up to 75 per cent.Whatever the ability of an interceptor to destroy an incomingwarhead, whether by fragmentation or atomic means, such a defence was likely to beimpracticable as it could be saturated by weight of numbers
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