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.If theextreme radicalism of some of the landless and poor peasant activistsseemed counterproductive, many cadres were also criticized for theirconservatism and quiescence.The CCP tried to attract more middle-peasant support, but, at least in the Taihang region, recruitment ofmiddle-peasant cadres was enormously controversial among local leaders.19Many thought them too conservative, interested only in their own farmseven if they had originally been poor.But Party leaders valued their skillsand appreciated their very moderation and ability to serve as bridgesamong the various groups in rural society.Middle peasants also had theeconomic resources to support themselves while working as cadres.As apractical matter, the relative equalization of landholdings by the end of thewar created middle-peasant dominance in most villages.At the same time,Communist organizers kept track of which middle peasants had formerlybeen poor and thus were redder than their neighbors.Peasants and politics: RadicalizationEven relatively moderate policies, under wartime conditions, producedfundamental social change a rural revolution in the base areas and evenbeyond.And the effects were felt in terms of village power relations, not justeconomically.New organizations gave peasants a voice.Of course, theCommunism, even revolutionary Communism, did not create a democraticutopia; coercion was part of the story.For the CCP, the key was to get peas-ants actively involved in local politics pursuing goals set by the top.Village-wide assemblies became common in base areas.They might beinitially manipulated by traditional elites, but the tendency over time was forpower to ebb away from the landed classes toward new activists.The term democracy in Chinese hands thus came to refer more to the idea ofparticipation than representative government.Elections were held in reasonably Revolution and civil war 353secure areas, and the Communists even voluntarily limited their own electionto a third of county and base area assembly seats.Another third were to benon-Communist leftists and a final third petty-bourgeoisie or landlords,even GMD members.In the Taihang base area, local governments were alsorequired to elect at least one woman.The Communists did not win all theelections they contested; nevertheless, the reality of Communist hegemonywas generally accepted.These elections were not an attempt to create Western-style parliamentarydemocracy.Rather, they were part of a legitimation process.The premisewas not that truth or wisdom would emerge in open contests betweencompeting interests but that avenues of communication between governmentand the people would be improved.In the context of 1939 40, when the three-thirds system was first implemented, it was also designed to allay thefears of rural elites by guaranteeing them a formal voice.But the programdid more than open lines of communication; along with the poor peasantsassociations, women s associations, youth leagues, and the like, it opened anew arena of political participation to ordinary peasants.Elections repre-sented an attempt to work out democratic ideas advocated by progressiveintellectuals since the late nineteenth century.To bring the people into polit-ical processes did not mean that decision-making was turned over to them,but it meant that their voices were heard.It fostered a sense of citizenship a sense of full membership in the community.Naturally, the Communists faced opposition, even uprisings.Landlordscovertly tried to get around land tax reforms by pretending to give land topoor relatives.Or they publicly signed leases with reduced rents but secretlythreatened to find new tenants unless they were paid the old rates.Some casesof spying and sabotage for Japanese puppet armies may have been motivatedby discontent with the Communists.Ordinary people, as well, were oftenangered by cadre misconduct.A fairer tax system may have improved impres-sions of the government, but taxes were still collected under duress.This waseven more the case with recruitment of boys into the army.A few cadres evenpracticed outright extortion, and not just against wealthy families.The CCPknew well that bad cadres would inspire popular dissatisfaction and weakenthe revolution, and crimes were occasionally prosecuted.For the most part,however, cadres were only subject to ideological re-education.It may be that the CCP naturally judged its own leniently.The Party alsodid not want to create passive cadres.A cadre afraid of doing anything forfear of public or Party criticism was as counterproductive as a corruptcadre.All cadres were subject to periodic review, at least after the rectifica-tion campaign of 1942 4.One county-level leader frankly noted: Cadresdo enjoy more privileges.They can raise bank loans, borrow grain from thearmy, and beat their wives. She added, Cadres who engage in these kindsof behavior are mostly capable and experienced but they act this waybecause of social influences, poor class status, or through their own weak-nesses. 20 Ordinary people might not have been so forgiving: it essentially 354 War and revolution, 1937 49depended on how well local cadres did in serving their communities.And onthe whole cadres could rely on the help of activists or progressiveelements to help them win over village doubters.Wartime conditions were appalling.Disease and even starvation were majorproblems
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